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IF I HAVE A DUTY, I NEED NOTICE TO SATISFY DUE PROCESS

INTRODUCTION
Criminal liability based on a failure to act, otherwise known as an
omission, first requires a duty to act. Yet, when the criminal statute does not
expressly provide for liability based on an omission, courts in this country have
looked elsewhere in the law to construct a duty to act. 1 However, such novel
statutory construction by the judiciary runs afoul of the Constitution and due
process. 2 The Due Process Clause requires that before criminal liability may be
imposed for violation of any penal law, due process requires “fair warning . . .
of what the law intends.” 3 “The fundamental requirement fixing criminal
responsibility is knowledge, actual or imputed, that the act of the slayer tended
to endanger life.” 4 The principle concern is that at the time of the defendant’s
conduct that the statute made it clear that such conduct is criminal. When the
statute fails to do so, fair notice and due process issues arise. A national
epidemic has been created by courts around the country imposing criminal
liability based on a failure to act when the statute with which he or she is
charged does not expressly provide for a legal duty to act. Courts have
imposed criminal liability upon defendants for failure to act in caring for their
children, elderly parents, and in drug overdose deaths where the victim
purchased drugs from the defendant. 5 Together, we must eliminate all
consideration of mere moral obligation and discover whether one is under a
legal duty towards another human. 6 Before criminal liability can be imposed,
the criminal code, pursuant to due process, must state with particularity the
conduct to be penalized.

1. See, e.g., People v. Oliver, 210 Cal. App. 3d 138, 149 (1989) (implementing the
Restatement Second of Torts to impose criminal liability based on a failure to act); see also State
v. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d 417, 422–23 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (relying on People v. Oliver, civil
common law negligence principles, and the legislature’s comment to statutes).
2. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).
3. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
4. State v. Beach, 329 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Mo. 1959).
5. See State v. Shrout, 415 S.W.3d 123 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (failing to care for child);
Gargus, 462 S.W.3d at 421 (failing to care for elderly parent); Commonwealth v. Marcelli, 441
N.E.2d 270 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (failure to obtain aid for victim who had abused alcohol and
dilaudid); State v. Voss, 2016 WL 145727 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (failure to obtain aid for victim
who was overdosing after purchasing heroin from defendant).
6. People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128, 1131 (Mich. 1907).
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In 1979, the Missouri Legislature established the Missouri Criminal Code,
a compilation of the criminal laws within the jurisdiction. 7 In deciding whether
something is criminal within the State of Missouri, one must look to the
Criminal Code. Section 556.026 provides that “no conduct constitutes an
offense . . . unless made so by this code or by other applicable statute.” 8
Thereafter, in Chapter 562 entitled “General Principles of Liability,” the
Missouri Legislature articulated the basis of criminal liability as based upon a
“voluntary act.” 9 Voluntary act is defined in subsection two as “(1) a bodily
movement performed while conscious as a result of effort or determination; or
(2) an omission to perform an act of which the actor is physically capable.” 10
Lastly, subsection four established that “a person is not guilty of an offense
based solely upon an omission to perform an act unless the law defining the
offense expressly so provides, or a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise
imposed by law.” 11
This paper will examine a recent case decided by the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri entitled State v. Gargus. 12 The
Missouri Court of Appeals imposed a duty to aid another human upon the
defendant, Linda Gargus, based upon an omission, or a failure to act. 13 The
effect of the decision is the introduction of civil tort negligence liability upon
criminal law. Part I will set forth the factual and procedural background, the
court’s analysis in Gargus that lead to the imposition of a duty, and examine
how other jurisdictions approach this similar issue. In Part II, I will raise and
examine the due process issues when criminal liability is imposed without
sufficient notice. Lastly, in Part IV, I will look to how Gargus has been applied
and propose the potential fallout from the opinion.
Generally, this paper seeks to examine the constitutional issues and
implications of holding someone criminally liable for an act or an omission
when the statute does not expressly enforce such a duty. This paper intends to
establish that the Missouri Court of Appeals ultimately misapplied the law and
misconstrued the applicable statutes. The main inquiry here is whether it is
constitutional to impose a legal duty to perform an act when the failure to
perform that act is not expressly provided by the statute.

7. See MO. REV. STAT. § 556.011 (2014). “This code shall be known and may be cited as
“The Criminal Code.”“
8. MO. REV. STAT. § 556.026 (2017).
9. § 562.011. Subsection 3 is excluded from this citation. Subsection 3 defines possession
as a voluntary act and is not applicable to the analysis contained hereafter.
10. Id.
11. Id. (emphasis added).
12. State v. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
13. See id.
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I. THE CASE: STATE OF MISSOURI V. LINDA GARGUS
A.

Factual Background

Lorraine Gargus, a diabetic eighty-one-year-old woman fell and became
bedbound in 2005. 14 Linda Gargus, the adult daughter of Lorraine started to
care for her ailing mother. 15 By 2009, Linda moved back into her parent’s
home and shortly thereafter quit her job as a certified nurse assistant at a
nursing home to care for her parents full time. 16 Linda was responsible for
every need of Lorraine, bathing her, changing her clothes, and giving her
medication. 17 Lorraine often rejected the care from her daughter. 18 Lorraine
developed bedsores and was reluctant to follow Linda’s treatment
recommendations. 19 “Linda told Lorraine that she should go to the hospital, but
Lorraine refused to go.” 20 Subsequently, Linda bought Lorraine an air mattress
and would attempt to turn Lorraine every hour, however, Lorraine kept rolling
to her back. 21 Fellow family members of the Gargus’ were discouraged from
visiting the residence. 22 In January of 2010, Lorraine’s husband died. 23
Lorraine stopped eating and drinking. 24 After the funeral Linda discouraged
family visits with Lorraine at the residence. 25 However, Cindy Hickman, a
granddaughter, visited in early February and described the home as dirty and
smelly. 26 Also, Sylvia Winger, a granddaughter, visited in early February, and
recalled not seeing anything alarming about Lorraine’s health. 27 In late
February, Linda dispatched emergency personnel to the home after discovering
a large sore on Lorraine’s foot. 28 Linda told emergency personnel that she
believed that Lorraine was giving up because her husband had just died. 29 The
next month, Lorraine passed away. 30 The autopsy performed revealed that the

14. Id. at 418.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d at 418.
18. Id. at 119.
19. Id.
20. Appellant’s Substitute Brief at 7, Gargus, 462 S.W.3d (No. SC93937), 2013 WL
3811369, at *3.
21. Id. at 7.
22. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d at 419.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d at 419.
28. Id.
29. Appellant’s Substitute Brief at 9, Gargus, 462 S.W.3d (No. SC93937), 2013 WL
3811369, at *9.
30. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d at 420.
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cause of death was organ failure due to septicemia 31 from multiple bedsores
and gangrene of the foot. 32 The bedsore on Lorraine’s back was the size of a
basketball. 33 The Department of Health investigated the Gargus home,
discovering nearly forty animal cages and extreme filth. 34 Dr. Crenshaw
testified at trial that the bedsore caused infection and turned septic. 35 He
further testified that the foot’s skin was removed down to the tendon and bone,
and was consistent with having been eaten by a rodent. 36 Dr. Torres performed
an autopsy on Lorraine and determined that the most significant contributor to
her death was the bedsore on her back. 37 Also contributing to her death was
gangrene in her left foot, severe coronary artery disease, fibrosis of the heart
and lungs, chronic bronchitis, and diabetes. 38 Linda Gargus was charged with
(1) involuntary manslaughter and (2) elder abuse in the first degree. 39 After a
jury trial, Linda was found not guilty of the charge of involuntary
manslaughter. 40 However, Linda was found guilty of elder abuse in the first
degree and subsequently was sentenced to ten years, as recommended by the
jury, in the Missouri Department of Corrections. 41
B.

Procedural History

The procedural history is relevant in this matter to establish a timeline for
the plight of Linda Gargus and to exhibit the transfer, retransfer, and readoption of legal authority between the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern
District and the Missouri Supreme Court. Lorraine Gargus died in March of
2010. 42 The State of Missouri in Clark County, Missouri brought felony
charges for involuntary manslaughter and elder abuse in the first degree in July

31. “Septicemia” is defined as a dangerous infection of the blood; “invasion of the
bloodstream by virulent microorganisms and especially bacteria along with their toxins from a
local seat of infection accompanied especially by chills, fever, and prostration –called also blood
poisoning.” Septicemia, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriam-web
ster.com/dictionary/septicemia [http://perma.cc/8B93-EJPJ].
32. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d at 420.
33. Id. at 419.
34. Id.
35. Appellant’s Substitute Brief at 11–12, Gargus, 462 S.W.3d (No. SC93937), 2013 WL
3811369, at *11–12.
36. Id. at 12.
37. Id. at 13.
38. Id.
39. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d at 420–21.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 421.
42. Id. at 420.
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2011. 43 In September 2012, the jury returned its guilty verdict. 44 On November
26, 2013, the Honorable Gary M. Gaertner, Jr. handed down an opinion
affirming the trial court’s judgment. 45 A motion for rehearing and/or transfer to
the Missouri Supreme Court was denied on January 13, 2014, yet later was
sustained and ordered transferred on February 25, 2014. 46 The Missouri
Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the matter on May 21, 2014. 47
Subsequently, the case was retransferred on May 27, 2014 to the Missouri
Court of Appeals. 48 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals opinion of Judge
Gaertner was readopted on June 2, 2014. 49
C. Framing the Issue: How Gargus Established A Duty to Care?
Linda Gargus was convicted of Elder Abuse in the First Degree. Elder
Abuse in the First Degree provides:
1. A person commits the crime of elder abuse in the first degree if he attempts
to kill, knowingly causes or attempts to cause serious physical injury, as
defined in section 565.002, to any person sixty years of age or older or an
50
eligible adult as defined in section 192.2400.

“A person acts knowingly or with knowledge . . . when he is aware his conduct
is practically certain to cause a result.” 51 On its face, the elder abuse in the
first-degree statute does not expressly provide for criminal liability based upon
a failure to provide care to another human being. Elder abuse in the firstdegree is not defined with language regarding a failure to act. Whereas, had
Linda Gargus been charged with elder abuse in the third-degree, she could
have been found criminally liable based upon a failure to act. The relevant
portion of the elder abuse in the third degree provides:
A person commits the crime of elder abuse in the third degree if he:
(4) Intentionally fails to provide care, goods or services to a person sixty years
of age or older or an eligible adult, as defined in section 192.2400. The result
of the conduct shall be such as would cause a reasonable person age sixty or

43. Docket Entries, Missouri CaseNet, 11CK-CR00103-01, https://www.courts.mo.gov/case
net/base/welcome.do [http://perma.cc/E7MJ-GRB3] (click “Case Number Search” and search
“11CK-CR00103-01”).
44. Id.
45. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d at 417.
46. Id.
47. Docket Entries, Missouri CaseNet, ED99233, https://www.courts.mo.gov/casenet/base/
welcome.do [http://perma.cc/E7MJ-GRB3] (click “Case Number Search” and search
“ED99233”).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.180 (2017). “Elder abuse in the first degree is a class A felony.”
51. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d at 424; see also § 562.016.3.
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older or an eligible adult, as defined in section 192.2400, to suffer physical or
emotional distress; or
(5) Knowingly acts or knowingly fails to act in a manner which results in a
grave risk to the life, body or health of a person sixty years of age or older or
52
an eligible adult.

The Missouri Legislature expressly provided that a failure to perform an act is
criminalized in the elder abuse, third degree, but did not criminalize the failure
to perform an act under elder abuse in the first degree. It follows that had the
legislature intended to include liability based on an omission in the elder abuse
in the first-degree statute, as it did so in the elder abuse in the third-degree
statute, it would have done so. Therefore, the failure to include any language
regarding an omission demonstrates a legislative intent that liability based on
an omission was not intended to be included under Section 565.180. It does not
follow that Linda Gargus’s conviction could be based upon an omission to act.
Thus, the relevant inquiry by the Gargus court was to determine whether a
duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law. 53
The Court of Appeals in Gargus determined that the law otherwise
imposed a duty upon Linda Gargus in finding that she had a duty to act in
caring for Lorraine Gargus. 54 The court relied upon the commentary to Section
562.011, “Voluntary acts,” as the basis for the its imposition of a duty to
care. 55 The comment cites to Jones v. United States, which establishes a set of
factors to consider in determining when “the failure to act may constitute a
breach of a legal duty:”
There are at least four situations in which the failure to act may constitute
breach of a legal duty. One can be held criminally liable: first, where a statute
imposes a duty to care for another; second, where one stands in a certain status
relationship to another; third, where one has assumed a contractual duty to care
for another; and fourth, where one has voluntarily assumed the care of another
56
and so secluded the helpless person as to prevent others from rendering aid.

In Jones, the defendant was indicted with involuntary manslaughter
because of a failure to perform a legal duty to care for another human. 57 The
defendant was a family friend of Shirley Green, who became pregnant out of
wedlock with child Robert. 58 Defendant and Green agreed that the child would
be taken into the defendant’s home after birth. 59 The parties later agreed to a

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

§ 565.184. Elder abuse in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.
See § 562.011.
Gargus, 462 S.W.3d at 422.
Id.
Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (1962).
Id. at 308.
Id.
Id.
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payment of $72/month for Robert’s care. 60 Green again became pregnant with
another child, Anthony, who defendant cared for in her home as well. 61 There
was no evidence of a monetary agreement between the defendant and Green
for the care of Anthony. 62 Both Anthony and Robert were removed from the
home and admitted to the hospital where Anthony later died from malnutrition
and lesions caused by diaper rash. 63 The court in Jones recognized that “under
some circumstances the omission of a duty owed by one individual to another,
where such omission results in the death of the one to whom the duty is owing,
will make the other chargeable with manslaughter.” 64 The court goes on to say
that this neglected duty must be legal in nature, “and not a mere moral
obligation.” 65 Next, the court established the aforementioned four situations
where a failure to act may create a breach of a legal duty to care. 66 Jones was
ultimately reversed and remanded for a new trial because of an improper jury
instruction, an instruction on the necessity for finding a legal duty of care. 67
The Gargus court placed tremendous reliance on the Comment to Section
562.011 where the citation of Jones is contained. 68 Official comments in
Missouri law are considered permissive and persuasive in determining
legislative intent. 69 However, such approach is in conflict with the Comment to
Section 556.026. Section 556.026 provides: “No conduct constitutes an offense
or infraction unless made so by this code or by other applicable statute.” 70 The
Comment to the section explicitly raises both due process concerns and the use
of the common law: “In view of the extensive declaration of offenses by statute
there is no need for the unwritten common law offense. Moreover, the idea of
the unwritten offense is repugnant to the concept of fair warning.” 71
In determining that Gargus secluded the victim, the Court of Appeals
relied on the fourth factor of Jones: “where one has voluntarily assumed the
care of another and so secluded the helpless person as to prevent others from
rendering aid.” 72 To find case law support, the court looked outside of
Missouri to support the proposition finding a legal duty based upon seclusion

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
1981).
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Jones, 308 F.2d at 308.
Id. at 308–09
Id. at 309.
Id. at 310.
Id.
Jones, 308 F.2d at 310.
Id. at 311.
See State v. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d 417, 422 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
See, e.g., Groppel Co., Inc. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 57 n.7 (Mo. Ct. App.
MO. REV. STAT. § 556.026 (2017).
Id., Comment to 1973 Proposed Code.
Gargus, 462 S.W.3d at 422.
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of the victim. 73 The court referenced Flippo v. State. 74 In Flippo, a father and
son (the “defendants”) were convicted of involuntary manslaughter. 75 The
defendants were hunting deer with rifles out of season. 76 After firing a round at
what was thought to be a deer, the defendants discovered the victim who was
wounded by a gunshot wound. 77 The men ran to a nearby residence and told
the resident that they found a wounded man and were leaving to seek medical
assistance. 78 The defendants drove twelve to fourteen miles away, passing
several phones along the way. 79 At their home, the defendants discarded the
rifle, called an ambulance, and then returned to escort the ambulance to the
victim. 80 There was testimony at trial that approximately forty minutes to an
hour and fifteen minutes transpired from the time of the accident to the arrival
of the ambulance. 81 In upholding the defendants’ conviction, the court
considered the Jones factors in analyzing whether there was a duty to act. 82 In
concluding that the defendants’ had a duty to act, the court held that “[t]he jury
could infer that Mr. Flippo’s delay caused the helpless victim to be secluded in
the field awaiting the promised aid and prevented or hindered others from
rendering timely aid.” 83
“[W]hen a person takes a vulnerable victim into his home rather than
leaving the victim in a public place where others could take care to prevent
harm to the victim, the person can be held criminally liable.” 84 The court in
Gargus relied upon People v. Oliver 85 in part as the basis for finding Linda
Gargus criminally liable for voluntarily assuming the care of Lorraine Gargus
and so secluding Lorraine away from the public in her home. 86 In Oliver, the
defendant (“Oliver”), a female, met the victim, a male at a local bar. 87 The
victim accompanied Oliver back to her residence. 88 While at the residence, the
victim asked Oliver for a spoon, Oliver provided one, and then the victim went
into Oliver’s bathroom and injected himself with heroin. 89 The victim came

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Flippo v. State, 523 S.W.2d 390 (Ark. 1975).
Id. at 391.
Id. at 391–92.
Id. at 392.
Id.
Flippo, 523 S.W.2d at 392.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 394.
State v. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d 417, 422 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
People v. Oliver, 210 Cal. App. 3d 138, 149 (1989).
Gargus, 462 S.W.3d at 422–23.
Oliver, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 143.
Id.
Id.
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out of the bathroom and into the living room where he fell to the floor
unconscious. 90 Oliver called her friend at the local bar. 91 He told her to leave
the victim and come back to the bar, Oliver obliged. 92 Oliver’s daughter and
her friends later returned home to find the victim passed out on the floor and
immediately phoned Oliver. 93 Oliver had her daughter drag the victim outside
of the house and placed him near the shed, the victim was still breathing at that
time. 94 Later that evening, Oliver’s daughter checked on the victim again
finding that the victim had a pulse and was still snoring. 95 The victim was
found dead in the yard the next morning. 96 The cause of death was morphine
poisoning (heroin). 97 In Oliver, the defendant was charged with involuntary
manslaughter. 98 The prosecution prosecuted the charge of involuntary
manslaughter under two theories: (1) Oliver aided and abetted the victim in the
commission of the use of a controlled substance, and (2) Oliver was criminally
negligent when she failed to summon medical aid for the victim and,
abandoned him, when she must have known he needed aid. 99 The jury was
instructed under both theories of involuntary manslaughter, and the jury’s
guilty verdict did not specify the theory which the jury based the verdict. 100
In upholding the conviction for involuntary manslaughter, the California
Court of Appeals in People v. Oliver based their reasoning on principles
derived from civil negligence theory. 101 First, the court had to establish that
Oliver had a duty to aid the victim in order to find her criminally liable for her
omission to render aid. 102 “Generally, one has no legal duty to rescue or render
aid to another in peril, even if the other is in danger of losing his or her life,
absent a special relationship which gives rise to such duty.” 103 Based on
reasoning from a string cite of civil cases, the court adopted the notion that a
special relationship that gives rise to an affirmative duty to act is based upon
the fact that “some act or omission on the part of the defendant either created
or increased the risk of injury to the plaintiff, or created a dependency
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Oliver, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 143.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 144.
96. Id.
97. Oliver, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 144.
98. Id. at 144–45
99. Id. at 145.
100. Id. at 145–46.
101. See generally id. at 146–51 (demonstrating criminal analysis follows civil negligence
theory).
102. Oliver, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 146.
103. Id. at 147 (emphasis added) (citing 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW,
282 (1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 314 (1965)).
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relationship inducing reliance or preventing assistance from others.” 104
Borrowing from the Restatement Second of Torts, the court adopted the
specific guidelines as to what types of conduct require affirmative action to
render aid:
(1) If the actor does an act, and subsequently realizes or should realize that it
has created an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to another, he is
under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking effect.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies even though at the time of the act
105
the actor has no reason to believe that it will involve such a risk.

In so reasoning, the court in Oliver found that the aforementioned rules that
impose a duty to render aid as an element of civil negligence are pertinent to
the imposition of a duty for criminal negligence purposes. 106 The first of the
combination of affirmative acts was Oliver leaving the bar with the extremely
drunk victim and driving him home. 107 This act removed the victim from
public where others could render aid or prevent harm. 108 The second
affirmative act was allowing the victim to use the bathroom to inject
narcotics. 109 Ultimately, the court concluded that Oliver’s affirmative acts
created an unreasonable risk for the victim; therefore, Oliver had a duty to
render aid. 110 It follows that the omission to provide aid to the victim
warranted a finding that Oliver breached her duty of care. 111 Oliver stands for
the principle that in California courts are permitted to seek guidance from civil
negligence standards derived from the Restatement of Torts in order to
determine a criminal duty to act. It follows that the Gargus court has
implemented civil negligence standards in the Missouri criminal law based on
its reliance on Oliver for support of the proposition that taking a vulnerable
person into a home away from the public where others can prevent harm can
be the basis for criminal liability.
Based on State v. Shrout, Linda Gargus’ duty to act arose singularly from
assuming the role as caretaker of Lorraine. 112 In Shrout, the victim was the
defendant’s adult child. 113 The court in Shrout expressly did not provide a
detailed recitation of the facts, only providing: “cold, sick, soaked in urine,

104. Id, at 147.
105. Id. at 147–48 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 321).
106. Id. at 149.
107. Oliver, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 149.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. The court again cites to the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 321, 324 for the
creation of the duty to act.
112. See State v. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d 417, 423–24 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
113. State v. Shrout, 415 S.W.3d 123, 125 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
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with a bucket of excrement as his toilet, Aaron Johnson died on a urine-drench
mattress on the tarp-covered floor of a room . . . .” 114 On appeal, the defendant,
the victim’s mother, argued that Missouri lacks a statute or law, which imposes
a duty upon a parent to protect or care for an adult child. 115 The court
recognized that Missouri’s manslaughter statute does not expressly provide for
violation based solely on omission. 116 Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial
court’s finding on the basis that:
[W]hen one voluntarily assumes the care of a mentally handicapped individual,
being fully aware of the individual’s physical and mental condition and the
care challenges created by those conditions . . . that the defendants both owed a
general duty of care to that young man and further a duty therefore to not act
117
recklessly or with criminal negligence in carrying out that duty.

Next, the Court of Appeals in Gargus sought support from civil law
principles by stating: “despite the distinction between omissions sufficient for
civil negligence liability and omissions sufficient to give rise to criminal
liability, Missouri civil precedent is instructive in determining when the duty to
act arises.” 118 The court first relied on State v. Studebaker, a case where the
defendant was convicted of manslaughter for driving his automobile in a safety
zone and striking the victim who was waiting to board a streetcar. 119 The
defendant in that case appealed regarding a jury instruction and whether its
language required a finding of criminal liability based upon civil negligence
standards. 120 The ultimate question for the court was to determine whether the
defendant’s actions constituted criminal negligence or common lawnegligence. 121 The court reasoned “the extent to which the negligent act
obviously imperils the life of another measures the state of mind of the doer in
legal contemplation and therefore his criminality.” 122 Further, “mere
inattention or mistaken judgment resulting even in the death of another is not
criminal unless the quality of the act makes it so. . .culpable negligence is
manslaughter.” 123 Next, the court in Gargus relied upon civil cases to stand for
the principle that a duty to act arises when a defendant assumes responsibility
to render services to another, even without an original duty to act, once the
defendant assumes that responsibility, he or she can be held liable for criminal

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 124.
Id. at 125.
Id. See also State v. Riggs, 2 S.W.3d 867, 870 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
Shrout, 415 S.W.3d at 125.
State v. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d 417, 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
State v. Studebaker, 66 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Mo. 1933).
Id.
Id. at 879.
Id. at 881.
Id.
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negligence in failing to perform that act. 124 To support this proposition, the
court relies on Bowan v. Express Medical Transports, Inc. and Martin v.
Missouri Highway & Transportation Department. 125
Then, the court relied upon a quote from a criminal law casebook to
support the proposition that a civil duty based on an omission and a criminal
duty based on an omission are the same. The quote states: “the measuring stick
of duty is the same in a criminal case as in the law of torts.” 126 The inclusion of
this quotation leads the reader to believe that the court, with sufficient support
from the law, has implemented civil negligence standards to the criminal law.
However, when reading further, it appears that Perkins & Boyce did not
intended for such an interpretation:
It is the exercise of due care and caution as represented by the conduct of a
reasonable person under like circumstances, and this in itself is intended to
represent the same requirement whatever the case may be . . . But whereas the
civil law requires conformity to this standard, a very substantial deviation is
127
essential to criminal guilt.

The court in Gargus by singularly including the “measuring stick” quotation
for support is holding the prosecution of criminal defendants to a civil
negligence standard: “There is a marked distinction between simple or
ordinary negligence, giving one a right of action for damages, and culpable
negligence, rendering one guilty of a criminal offense.” 128 The importation of
civil negligence standards into the criminal law runs afoul of the due process
clause when fair notice, certainty, and clarity of criminal standards are lacking.

124. State v. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d 417, 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
125. Bowan v. Express Med. Transports, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (A
civil negligence case arising from an automobile accident where a non-emergency transportation
company was held liable for damages to a Passenger; the court held that transportation company
had no statutory duty, yet the company was found to have a common law duty evidenced by its
voluntary assumption of a duty to make certain the passenger was seat belted.); Martin v. Mo.
Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 981 S.W.2d 577, 585 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (A civil wrongful death
action arising out of a car accident finding that defendant had a duty to maintain ‘clear areas’
along roadway holding that the law in Missouri is clear where “liability may be imposed upon
one who is under no duty to act but does so voluntarily or gratuitously.”).
126. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d at 423 (citing ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE,
CRIMINAL LAW, 843 (1982)).
127. PERKINS & BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW, 843 (1982).
128. Id. at 844.
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D. How Other Jurisdictions Approach the Issue of Duty
1.

Michigan

Jones v. United States cites to a Michigan Supreme Court case from 1907
entitled People v. Beardsley. 129 Jones cites to Beardsley for the proposition of
when a duty is established one must take action to preserve the life of
another. 130 Beardsley states:
The law recognizes that under some circumstances the omission of a duty
owed by one individual to another, where such omission results in the death of
the one to whom the duty is owing, will make the other chargeable with
manslaughter. This rule of law is always based upon the proposition that the
duty neglected must be a legal duty, and not a mere moral obligation. It must
be a duty imposed by law or by contract, and the omission to perform the duty
131
must be the immediate and direct cause of death.

In Beardsley, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter. 132 The
defendant made arrangements with another woman, the victim, while his wife
was out of town. 133 The defendant lived in two rooms on the ground floor of a
house with other tenants occupying other rooms. 134 On one evening the
defendant and victim drank liquor together. 135 Defendant ordered liquor by
telephone, a young man responded, and was asked by the victim, without the
defendant’s knowledge, to purchase camphor and morphine tablets. 136 Later in
the day, the victim became unresponsive. 137 The defendant, who was
intoxicated himself, summoned help, and moved the victim to another room
occupied by Mr. Skoba so his wife would not see the woman. 138 By the late
evening, Mr. Skoba was alarmed at her condition and called a doctor who
pronounced the victim dead. 139 The court in Beardsley reasoned that in order to
create a criminal liability for neglect by nonfeasance, “the neglect must also be
of a personal legal duty, the natural and ordinary consequences of neglect of
which would be dangerous to life.” 140 The court considered that the victim was
an adult past thirty years of age, was accustomed to the use of intoxicants, that

129. Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (1962); see also People v. Beardsley, 113
N.W. 1128 (Mich. 1907).
130. Jones, 308 F.2d at 310.
131. Id. (citing Beardsley, 113 N.W. at 1129).
132. Beardsley, 113 N.W. at 1128.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1129.
136. Id.
137. Beardsley, 113 N.W. at 1129.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1130.
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there was no evidence of duress or fraud upon her, and that she went on the
carouse with the defendant voluntarily. 141 In so reasoning, the court held that
the defendant had no legal duty, either by fact or by implication to the
victim. 142
2.

California

In 1994, the California Supreme Court reviewed California’s elder abuse
statute for a challenge to the statute’s constitutionality. 143 The statute in
question criminalizes acts of an abuser against an elder as well as any person
who permits any elder to suffer abuse. 144 The court ultimately found that the
statute failed to provide fair notice for criminal liability and failed to provide
clear standards for enforcement. 145 However, the statute survived the void for
vagueness analysis as the court found that the imposition of criminal liability
under the elder abuse statute at issue applied to a person, who “under existing
tort principles, has a duty to control the conduct of the individual who is
directly causing or inflicting abuse on the elder or dependent adult.” 146 The
court cited to People v. Oliver 147 in part to save the statute from being void for
vagueness on the grounds that civil negligence tort liability principles are
applicable for the imposition of criminal liability under California law. 148 In so
reasoning, the court looked to whether there was a special relationship between
the defendant and victim, yet did not find the kind of special relationship that
would give rise to a duty. 149
In Heitzman, the defendant was the daughter of the victim, Robert. 150 The
victim lived in the home of Richard Sr. and Jerry, the defendant’s brothers. 151
The victim’s cause of death was due to septic shock from bed sores caused by

141. Id. at 1131.
142. Beardsley, 113 N.W. at 1131.
143. See People v. Heitzman, 886 P.2d 1229 (Cal. 1994).
144. CAL. PENAL CODE § 368 (2000). “Crimes against elder or dependent adults. (b)(1) Any
person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death,
willfully causes or permits any elder or dependent adult, with knowledge that he or she is an elder
or a dependent adult, to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering,
or having the care or custody of any elder or dependent adult, willfully causes or permits the
person or health of the elder or dependent adult to be injured, or willfully causes or permits the
elder or dependent adult to be placed in a situation in which his or her person or health is
endangered.”
145. Heitzman, 886 P.2d at 1231.
146. Id.
147. People v. Oliver, 210 Cal. App. 3d 138, 149 (1989).
148. Heitzman, 886 P.2d at 1249.
149. Id. at 1231.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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malnutrition, dehydration, and neglect. 152 A year before the death of the
victim, the defendant moved away from the home leaving the primary care to
Richard Sr. and Jerry. 153 The defendant was charged under the aforementioned
elder abuse statute for “willfully permitting an elder to suffer unjustifiable
physical pain and mental suffering.” 154 The principle issue for the Heitzman
court was “whether the statute adequately denotes the class of persons who
owe such a duty.” 155 The defendant made the argument that the statute is
unconstitutional because it seems to impose a legal duty on people to prevent
physical or mental abuse on an elder, when they may not reasonably know they
have a duty. 156 The court rejected the notion that the statute imposes a blanket
duty on every person because such a reading of the statute would create an
anomaly. 157 However, the court concluded that the statute’s language does not
convey adequate notice as to who may be under a duty to prevent the infliction
of physical or mental abuse on an elder. 158
The Heitzman court’s analysis of the fair notice and certainty
constitutionality issues is informative to the issues presented by the Gargus
court. As an example, compare the “any person” 159 language of the California
statute to the Missouri language of “a person.” 160 Both the Heitzman defendant
and the Gargus defendant’s liability were based on an omission. Like
Heitzman, where the court noted that the statutory language leads to the
interpretation that any person could be found criminally liable, here, the elder
abuse in the first-degree statute lends the same interpretation. 161 The California
statute was held to fail to provide notice or clear standards as to who is under a
duty to prevent the infliction of mental or physical pain on an elder. 162 In
Gargus, criminal liability under elder abuse in the first degree based on an
omission also fails to provide notice. The statute does not expressly provide for
liability based on an omission. Enforcement based on the precedent established
by Gargus would lead to uneven application of the law and runs afoul of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

152. Id. at 1232.
153. Heitzman, 886 P.2d at 1232.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1234. The duty in question here is that in order for a person to be held criminally
liable under section 368, the defendant must first be under a legal duty to act.
156. Id. at 1235.
157. Id. at 1236.
158. Heitzman, 886 P.2d at 1236. The court focused on the language at the start of the statute:
“any person.” Id. (emphasis added).
159. CAL. PENAL CODE § 368 (2000) (emphasis added).
160. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.180 (2017) (emphasis added).
161. State v. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
162. Id.
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Texas

Another instructive jurisdiction on the issue of fair notice when coupled
with an omission for criminal liability is Texas. In Billingslea v. State, 163 the
defendant was convicted of injury to an elderly individual. 164 There, the victim
lived with the defendant, his wife, and son. 165 The defendant forbade the
victim’s granddaughter from visiting the house, which ultimately prompted a
hotline phone call to the department of social services. 166 The victim’s heel as
well as her hip and back were eaten away by large bedsores. After transport to
the hospital, maggots were found festering on the bedsores. 167 As a matter of
first impression, the Texas Appellate Court was presented with the question of
whether criminal liability could be imposed for omissions against the
elderly. 168
The defendant in Billingslea was charged under Penal Code § 22.04.169
The indictment predicated liability on grounds that the defendant failed to
obtain medical care for the victim. 170 The State argued that the duty to act on
the part of the defendant on behalf of an elderly person might be derived from
legal or common law duties. 171 Furthermore, the State argued that the
defendant owed a duty because he voluntarily assumed care; by voluntarily
assuming care he prevented others from rendering aid. 172 The court rejected
the State’s arguments. 173 In so reasoning, the court first established that for
liability to be based on an omission, (1) a statute must provide that an omission
is an offense, or (2) a statute establishes a duty, and a failure to perform that
duty equals an offense. 174 The court then examined the constitutional issues
that arise when predicating criminal liability based on a failure to perform a
duty that is not imposed by law. 175 At this point in the analysis Texas deviates
from the Missouri approach set forth in Gargus: “While other States may
imply duties or derive them from the common law, under the laws of this State

163. Billingslea v. State, 780 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
164. Id. at 271.
165. Id. at 272.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 273.
169. Id. See also TEX. CRIM. CODE § 22.04 (1989). The text of the statute in effect at the time
the defendant was charged is different than a recent modification by the Texas legislature in 2015
to include “omission.”
170. Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 273.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 274.
174. Id. at 274.
175. Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 276.
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(Texas) notice of an offense must invariably rest on a specific statute.” 176
Texas precedent has forbidden the use of common law duties as the foundation
of criminal sanctions. 177 Texas, like Missouri, has an all-encompassing statute
that characterizes when conduct constitutes an offense. 178 Texas Penal Code §
1.03(a) provides: “conduct does not constitute an offense unless it is defined as
offense by statute, municipal ordinance, order of a county commissioners
court, or rule authorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute.” 179
Compare to Missouri’s statute: Section 556.026 provides that “no conduct
constitutes an offense unless made so by this code or by other applicable
statute.” 180 Yet, Texas reasons that penal provisions that “criminalize a failure
to act without informing those subject to prosecution that they must perform a
duty to avoid punishment are unconstitutionally vague.” 181 The court
concluded that although the indictment alleged sufficient facts to support a
duty to act based on an omission under the common law, the indictment was
defective because there was no associated statutory duty to care for an elderly
person. 182
The Texas Legislature, since the Billingslea indictment dismissal and
subsequent opinion, amended the § 22.04 statute. 183 The court recognized the
amendment of the statute to include liability based on an omission meant that
the legislature “perceived the paradoxical futility of applying the former law:
there could never be a failure to perform that which no one had a statutory duty
to perform in the first place.” 184
II. DUE PROCESS & FAIR NOTICE
The Court of Appeals in Gargus imposed civil common law liability
principles in establishing that Linda Gargus had a duty to aid the victim. 185
Because the elder abuse in the first degree does not expressly provide for
liability based on an omission nor expressly impose a duty to prevent harm to
another, an issue of fair notice is raised. “The Government violates the Due
Process Clause when it takes away someone’s life, liberty, or property under a
criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the
conduct it punishes, or so standard-less that it invites arbitrary

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
Id.
TEX. CRIM. CODE §1.03(a) (1994).
MO. REV. STAT. § 556.026 (2017).
Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 275–76.
Id. at 276.
TEX. CRIM. CODE § 22.04 (2015).
Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 277.
State v. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d 417, 421–22 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
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enforcement.” 186 The Missouri Constitution provides in Article I, Section 10
“that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.” 187 Furthermore, the United States Constitution guarantees due
process of law in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 188 The United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause in the context of
the criminal code to mean, “no one may be required at peril of life, liberty, or
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.” 189 Furthermore, a
penal statute must “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner
that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 190 The Due
Process Clause also forbids courts from applying a novel construction of a
statute. 191
When applied to the criminal context, Missouri courts presume a statute to
be constitutional and will only hold otherwise if the statute plainly contravenes
a constitutional provision. 192 Whereas, a statute that fails to clearly define
proscribed conduct violates the Due Process Clause and is considered to be
void for vagueness. 193 “A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to give a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden.” 194 A criminal defendant, as a matter of due process, is entitled to
notice of the charges against him and may not be convicted of any offense of
which the information or indictment does not give him fair notice.” 195
Furthermore, recall Missouri’s statute for when conduct constitutes an offense,
Section 556.026’s commentary: “[i]n view of the extensive declaration of
offenses by statute there is no need for the unwritten common law offense. 196
Moreover, the idea of the unwritten offense is repugnant to the concept of fair
warning.” 197

186. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2554 (2015).
187. MO. CONST. art. I, § 10.
188. See U.S. CONST. amend. V & U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
189. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
190. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
191. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997). Novel construction occurs when a
court constructs a criminal statute to conduct that the statute or any other judicial decision has
disclosed to be within its scope. Id.
192. State v. Crawford, 478 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Mo. 1972).
193. State v. Allen, 905 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Mo. 1995).
194. GREGORY S. PARKS ET AL., ALPHA PHI ALPHA 295–96 (2012) (emphasis added).
195. State v. Miller, 372 S.W.3d 455, 466 (Mo. 2012).
196. Cmt. to MO. REV. STAT. § 556.026 (2017).
197. § 556.026; § 556.026., Comment to Proposed Code.
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New Jersey’s Approach

A case not mentioned by the Court of Appeals in Gargus, but particularly
instructive of the fair notice and due process considerations, is State v. Lisa. 198
The principal holding of the Lisa case provided that a New Jersey statute that
regarded an omission as a basis for criminal liability did not provide sufficient
notice to satisfy a person’s due process rights to the degree that the statute
incorporated civil common law principles. 199 The defendant was charged with
a five-count indictment that included reckless manslaughter because the victim
purchased methadone from the defendant. 200 Victim ingested the methadone
and attended several parties during the evening where she consumed alcohol
and smoked marijuana. 201 Defendant and victim had sex on defendant’s bed,
and shortly thereafter she passed out. 202 Victim was unresponsive. 203
Defendant’s friend suggested calling 9-1-1 three times, to which Defendant did
not comply. 204 Emergency aid was summoned at 5:00 p.m. the following
day. 205 The victim died approximately ten days later in the hospital. 206 Multiorgan system failure caused by ethanol and drugs was pronounced as the cause
of death. 207 The defendant’s motion to dismiss the manslaughter count was
granted. 208
The text of the New Jersey manslaughter statute and the statutory
definition of “conduct” are relevant for its analogous language to that of
Missouri’s voluntary act statute. In New Jersey, to determine whether a
defendant should be charged with reckless manslaughter, evidence must first
be presented showing the defendant engaged in conduct that caused the
victim’s death. . . .” 209 Conduct in New Jersey is defined as:
an action or omission or a series of actions or omissions. Action means a
bodily movement, whether voluntary or involuntary. Omission means the
failure to act. The law provides that criminal liability for an offense may not be
based on an omission or a failure to act unaccompanied by action unless a duty
210
to perform the omitted act is other wise imposed by the law.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

State v. Lisa, 919 A.2d 145 (N.J. Super A.D. 2007).
Id. at 160.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 148.
Lisa, 919 A.2d at 148.
Id.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
Id.
Lisa, 919 A.2d at 150.
Id.
Id.
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For comparison purposes, recall Missouri’s voluntary act statute, Section
562.011:
A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct
which includes a voluntary act.
2. A “voluntary act” is
(1) a bodily movement performed while conscious as a result of effort or
determination; or
(2) An omission to perform an act of which the actor is physically capable.
4. A person is not guilty of an offense based solely upon an omission to
perform an act unless the law defining the offense expressly so provides, or a
211
duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law.

The court in Lisa included the State’s grand jury instructions. The State
instructed the grand jury as follows: “a person has a duty to act where he has
voluntarily assumed the care of another and so secluded the helpless person as
to prevent others from rendering aid.” 212 “A person has the duty to act when
the person is responsible for placing the victim in the position of danger or
peril.” 213 The court recognized that the State based this instruction from
several provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 214 The court reasoned
by examining several other jurisdictions imposition of a duty to aid based on
omission. 215 However, the Lisa court concluded that New Jersey “has never
definitively adopted the common-law principles embodied in the several
Restatement provisions that formed the basis” of the aforementioned grand
jury charge. 216
The instruction given in Gargus stated in part:
Linda Gargus, by having voluntarily assumed the care of her mother, Lorraine
Gargus, a person unable to meet her physical and medical needs, by moving
into Lorraine Gargus’ house, performing basic caregiving functions such as
providing food and water, and representing to others that she was the primary
217
caregiver for Lorraine Gargus . . . .

The principle issue with the jury instruction given in Gargus is that the
instruction did not require the jury to find that Linda Gargus had a legal duty to

211. MO. REV. STAT. § 556.011 (2014). Subsection 3 is omitted, as the act of “possession” is
not at issue here.
212. Lisa, 919 A.2d at 150–51.
213. Id. at 151.
214. Id. The Court included the provisions from the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314,
314A, 321, 322, 324, 326. Id. at 156–57.
215. Id. at 157–59.
216. Id. at 159.
217. Brief for Appellant at 16, State v. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (No. ED
99233), 2013 WL 3811369, at *16.
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perform some act, but failed to perform that act. The Court of Appeals in
Gargus then interpreted and imposed a legal duty to aid on Linda Gargus in
order to support the affirmance of her conviction. 218 Even if the trial court
included a legal duty for criminal liability of elder abuse in the first-degree,
such instruction would likely have been akin to the instruction given in Lisa
and subsequently considered, as the court in Lisa concluded, a violation of due
process. 219 Therefore, it follows that any imposition of a criminal liability
based on a failure to act when the law does not otherwise provide a duty to act
is a violation of due process.
The Lisa court ultimately was concerned about violation of the
fundamental procedural due process notice requirements. In so concluding, the
court reasoned, “notice is the first requirement of procedural due process.” 220
When applied to the criminal law, the principle requires that “criminal statutes
should be clear and understandable in order to achieve two goals: notice of
illegality and clear standards for enforcement.” 221 The court mentioned that it
failed to see how civil common law principles could satisfy procedural due
process notice requirements to justify criminal liability. 222 Ultimately, “[a]
duty of care, upon which a duty to act is premised, must be so firmly
established as to be beyond controversy or dispute if it is to provide presumed
notice.” 223
IV. THE APPLICATION OF GARGUS
A recent surge in heroin deaths in Missouri has led to indictments of the
supplier or the ‘drug dealer.’ 224 Gargus has already been applied to support the
finding of criminal liability based on an omission. 225 Earlier this year, the
Missouri Court of Appeals handed down State v. Voss, a case of firstimpression. 226 Motion for rehearing or transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court

218. State v. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d 417, 421–22 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
219. Lisa, 919 A.2d at 160.
220. Id. at 159.
221. Id. at 159–60.
222. Id. at 160.
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Robert Patrick, Man Accused of Dealing Fatal Heroin Dose to St. Louis
County Official’s Nephew, SAINT LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.stltoday.
com/news/local/crime-and-courts/man-accused-of-dealing-fatal-heroin-dose-to-st-louis/article_8b
f86642-a297-5245-ad9a-ef150a8d7898.html [http://perma.cc/HU2H-GWZE]; Valerie Schremp
Hahn, Siblings Charged with Murder in Heroin Overdose, SAINT LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May
19, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/siblings-charged-with-murder-in-heroin-o
verdose/article_89726f28-b7fd-5440-a81c-258a5a48d480.html [http://perma.cc/V2B4-9KPD].
225. See State v. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
226. State v. Voss, 488 S.W.3d 97, 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). In this case, there was a first
impression as to finding criminal liability for the drug dealer who sold the drugs to an individual,
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was denied on February 29, 2016 and application for transfer was subsequently
denied on May 24, 2016. 227 In Voss, the defendant was charged with seconddegree murder, but was convicted of the lesser-included offense of involuntary
manslaughter. 228 The victim called the defendant and requested to purchase
heroin from him. 229 En route to a hotel with another friend, Curtis, the
defendant gave the victim nine capsules of heroin and syringes. 230 While at the
hotel, the victim began to prepare to inject himself with the heroin, however,
the defendant interjected stating that he should prepare it because he was more
experienced. 231 The victim consulted the defendant on how much heroin to
use. 232 The victim injected himself with the heroin and immediately began
“nodding off.” 233 Defendant left the room to get the victim some ice because
he feared that the victim might be suffering a heroin overdose. 234 Shortly
thereafter, the victim, who was sweating profusely, walked the defendant and
Curtis to the door. 235 The victim shook the defendant’s hand and paid him one
hundred dollars for the heroin. 236 The next morning the housekeeper found the
victim deceased in the hotel room. 237 The verdict director for involuntary
manslaughter stated: “Defendant caused the death of Victim by not summoning
medical help when [Victim] showed signs of a drug overdose after he injected
heroin he purchased from [D]efendant.” 238
More recently, the Missouri Court of Appeals again was faced with an
appeal of an involuntary manslaughter conviction of the heroin supplier in
State v. Shell. 239 In Shell the defendant and victim pooled their money together
to purchase heroin. 240 The defendant picked the victim up from the victim’s
house, drove to defendant’s house and injected themselves with heroin, then
the defendant took the victim back home. 241 The victim went inside his
residence and told his mother he was going to bed where the victim was found

who later died. Id. at 110. The court held that criminal liability is based on the omission to seek
aid. Id. at 113.
227. Id. at 97.
228. Id. at 107–08.
229. Id. at 104.
230. Id. at 105.
231. Voss, 488 S.W.3d at 105.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Voss, 488 S.W.3d at 105.
237. Id. at 106.
238. Id. at 109 (emphasis in original).
239. State v. Shell, 501 S.W.3d 22, 24 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
240. Id. at 25.
241. Id.
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dead the next afternoon. 242 Per experts who testified at trial, the victim died
within two to six hours after injection of the heroin. 243 On appeal, the
defendant argued that the charge of involuntary manslaughter did not impose a
duty to seek medical care for the victim. 244
Like elder abuse in the first-degree, Missouri’s manslaughter statute does
not provide for liability based on an omission, nor is it defined in terms of a
failure to act. 245 In affirming his conviction, the Voss court first relied on the
precedent from Gargus to establish that criminal liability can be based on
omission to perform an act, “if a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise
imposed by law.” 246 Further, the court in Voss adopted the Gargus principle
that where evidence is present to support a conviction for involuntary
manslaughter consists of affirmative acts and omissions, the defendant can still
be found guilty “even if a duty to perform the omitted act is not otherwise
imposed by law.” 247 The court reasoned that the affirmative acts consisted of
selling the defendant heroin, suggesting how much heroin to use, and preparing
the heroin. 248 A duty then existed for the defendant to go back and check on
the victim because based on Gargus, a duty to perform the omitted act is
otherwise imposed by law. Thus, because Gargus established that although a
statute does not expressly provide for liability based on an omission, a duty
otherwise imposed by law and an affirmative act coupled with an omission
create criminal liability.
In contrast, the court in Shell factually distinguishes Voss by comparing the
amount of involvement in the victim’s use of heroin. 249 The court in Shell
again relied on the precedent of Gargus, to determine whether the defendant in
Shell had a duty to act based upon a voluntary assumption of care of a
vulnerable person, the victim. 250 By comparing the “egregious” facts of
Gargus, where criminal liability was found based on the voluntary assumption
of care and seclusion, the Shell court noted that the victim was not entirely
dependent on the defendant throughout the evening. 251 The court held: “the
law did not impose a duty to act because the defendant did not seclude the
victim, and the victim was not dependent on the defendant medical care.” 252

242. Id.
243. Id. at 26.
244. Shell, 501 S.W.3d at 29.
245. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.024 (2016).
246. State v. Voss, 488 S.W.3d 97, 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
247. Id. (emphasis added).
248. Id. at 112.
249. State v. Shell, 501 S.W.3d 22, 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
250. Id. at 30–32.
251. Id. at 32. The victim held a conversation with his mother, completed laundry, and went
to bed. Id.
252. Id.
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CONCLUSION
A plausible explanation for the Gargus court’s reasoning is the moral
consideration of the horrific factual background set forth in section I. The
Missouri Court of Appeals confirmed this notion in the Shell opinion. 253 The
Texas Billingslea court stated the root of the issue: “while children may have a
moral duty to care for their elderly parents, moral imperatives are not the
functional equivalent of legal duties.” 254 Absent an express legal duty in the
criminal law, any finding of a criminal defendant’s liability for a failure to act
is a distinct violation of the due process clause. The Gargus court’s express
reliance on the Commentary to Section 562.011 to find a legal duty otherwise
imposed by law and seeming ignorance to the Commentary to Section 556.026
is extremely troublesome. 255 The Missouri Supreme Court has had the
opportunity to provide guidance, yet has not done so. The legislature must act
to uphold constitutional due process rights before more criminal defendants are
held criminally responsible for a legal duty he or she was not expressly made
aware by statute.
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